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1. Introduction
1. The concept of multifunctional agriculture has stimulated a wide-ranging debate among
researchers and policy-makers. The academic challenge is that multifunctionality demands analyses that
are far from standard. When characterizing the production of goods, we have returned to concepts like
jointness - a notion that had almost vanished from the economic literature (Baumgärtner 1999). In the
consumption sphere we have acknowledged that goods typically seems to be relational (Romstad et al.
2000). Both joint products and relational goods imply interrelationships that do not fit well with the kind of
axiomatic structure that dominates economic theory.
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2. Furthermore, it has become clear that to talk about 'optimal' policies without also taking
transaction costs into account, has become rather futile. While transaction cost is an increasingly popular
concept within economics - e.g., Williamson (1985); Eggertsson (1990); Challen (2000) - its use has also
led to confusion (Vatn and Bromley 1997; Vatn 1998). The fact that transaction costs are both system
specific and difficult to measure does not simplify the analysis.
3. Finally, if transaction costs are positive, who the rights holder is matters for what becomes an
optimal resource allocation (Randall 1974). This forces us to discuss issues that are more political than
economic. At least we have to be very explicit concerning the assumptions we use regarding rights when
drawing our conclusions. This is important when we study issues not least of relevance for international
trade.
4. Working in this field, it is difficult to be consistent. It is too easy to resort to a standard
conclusion that is well established under certain assumptions, but not valid when transaction costs are
positive or goods are joint in production.
5. The focus of this paper is on the role of transaction costs (TC) in defining what is an optimal – or
more realistically – a reasonable policy. Transaction costs are defined as the costs of gathering information,
making decisions/contracting, and controlling/policing to ensure that the results are what was intended.
4
The study of TC and optimality must be based on insights about the characteristics of the goods involved. I
will thus start with a short examination of this issue. Concerning TC more specifically, I start by
considering the trade-off between TC and precision. This is followed by a more detailed analysis of the
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3. While the concept of jointness played a rather notable role in the writings of classical economists, it almost
went out of use as a result of the establishment of neoclassical theory. Baumgärtner (1999) argues that an
important reason for this was that it did not fit into the new theoretical structures that were established.
4. Falconer and Whitby (1999) give a short overview of different ways transaction costs are defined in the
literature. The listing I use is based on Dahlman (1979)3
choice of policies given different assumptions about the characteristics of the goods in question and TC.
Often choices have to be made in situations where very specific knowledge about these relationships is
lacking. I will thus also try to develop some ‘meta’ rules for handling the intrinsic information problems
faced in this kind of situation.
2. What is multfunctionality?
2.1 The character of the goods
6. OECD (2001) makes the following clarification: 'Multifunctionality refers to the fact that an
economic activity may have multiple outputs and, by virtue of this, may contribute to several societal
objectives at once. Multifunctionality is thus an activity-oriented concept that refers to specific properties
of the production process and its multiple outputs' (p. 11).
7. The multiple outputs may consist of a mix of both private and public goods. There is an ongoing
debate about the classification of these. Partly this has to do with the fact that institutional changes may in
some cases move a good from one category to another. The following list summarizes outputs from
agriculture that in my opinion have distinct public characteristics:
°Environmental aspects
· Landscape
- Biological diversity
- Recreation
- Aesthetics
· Cultural heritage
· Pollution (changes in matter cycles; genetic pollution etc.)
° Food security (availability in different situations)
° Food safety (quality/phyto-sanitary status)
° Rural concerns
· Rural settlement
· Local economic activity
8. The sub-list of environmental aspects contains both positives and negatives – i.e., pollution.
Further, the relationship between the production of some public goods and the production of private goods
can be either positive or negative dependent on the specific situation – e.g., biodiversity.
9. It is important to acknowledge that the various goods (and bads) are components of an integrated
production system. They are an interlinked set of functions. While some of the listed aspects may be
produced independently of agriculture, it is difficult to imagine an agricultural system that does not affect
all the elements in the above list. In this sense all the listed public goods/bads are dependent on primary
production. They are characteristics of the system as a whole. This stems to a large degree from the fact
that agricultural production is directly interlinked with the eco-systems it operates within and the space that
it occupies.
10. The goods listed are complex, by which is meant that each good consists of several elements,
many of which are best described as processes. Qualitative aspects are often as important as the
quantitative. The fact that many of the goods are relational is of specific importance. This implies that the
value of one good (or sub-element of a good) depends on the quantity and quality of others. Landscape
values are typical examples. The aesthetic value may depend on the level of biodiversity. The value of a
track may depend strongly on the interrelated mosaic of other landscape elements.4
2.2 Private vs. public
11. The concepts of private and public goods are very important in the study of multifunctionality.
Ostrom et al. (1994) offer the following structure to illustrate the distinction.
Figure 1.Characterization of goods according to costs of exclusion and rivalry in use
Source: Derived from Ostrom et al. (1994).
12. According to this figure, costs of exclusion and rivalry in use are the important elements when
describing the different types of goods. Private goods are easily excludable and rival in use. Public goods
are at the opposite end of this characterization. Common pool resources are also rival in use like private
goods, while exclusion is not easy. It is in this square we find what is termed negative externalities. In the
case of club goods, excludability is a possibility for larger groups, while the good is not rival in use.
13. The costs of exclusion or demarcation are part of what we have earlier termed transaction costs.
While they are presented as classes (high and low), these costs will normally vary from almost zero to
almost infinity.
14. The concept of club goods brings institutional elements explicitly into the characterization of the
goods. This is a bit confusing. It is by establishing the club that low costs of exclusion are produced. It is
not an inherent character of the good itself. Clubs may also be formed to govern common pool resources.
In fact, that is the dominant institutional solution, be it pastures, irrigation systems or many fisheries. In the
case of open sea fisheries, the 'club' is often a nation state.
15. Ostrom et al. use the concept ‘common pool resources’. Here they avoid the error of mixing
resource characteristics with regimes. These kinds of resources are often termed ‘common property
resources’. This is an error (Bromley 1991). The same resource according to Figure 1 may be governed by
different regimes. In the case of a common pool resource, it may be governed by an open access or by a
common property regime. Further, private goods may be produced under a private property regime, but
this is not a necessity. On the other hand, public goods seem to demand some type of common provision if
they are be produced, unless they are free goods jointly produced with private ones.
16. Despite these inconsistencies, the distinction between private and public goods is crucial to
understand some of the provision problems that will be focused on later.
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2.2 Relationships between the production of private and public goods
17. Multifunctionality – as defined by OECD (2001) – is a multi-product production. – i.e., the
enterprises produce more than one good. In such a context production may either be joint, complementary
or competing. Jointness implies that when a firm produces more than one output, inputs cannot be assigned
specifically to each output. Thus the production function includes both outputs as a function of the relevant
inputs (Gravelle and Rees 1981). In such a situation it may be relevant to describe the output of one good
as a function of the other. Jointness can cover both goods and bads, and if they are not excludable, they
will often be termed positive or negative externalities, respectively.
18. In the case of complementarity the production of one good contributes an element of production,
which is joint to this product and required in the production of a second good. Classical examples in
agriculture are the production of hay, which contributes positively to soil fertility (joint product), which in
turn improves the productivity of grain production (complementary product). Complementarity normally
occurs within certain ranges. Beyond these ranges the two productions are  competing  for the common
factor of production.
19. There is a strong tendency in the literature to use functional relationships when describing
jointness and the concept of the production possibility area to describe complementarity and competition.
There are good reasons for this. Still, a better understanding of the relationship between the two is
important. It may have some implications for conclusions concerning the choice of policy instruments.
This paper does not offer space for such a clarification, though.
3. Transaction costs and efficiency
20. Transaction costs play a crucial role in defining what is an optimal policy.
5 However,
incorporating TCs complicates the analysis both theoretically and empirically. This explains both the
relative lack of interest in the subject and the many inconsistencies observed in the literature concerning
the effect of TC.
6 The aim of this section is to clarify some of the relevant issues.
3.1 Transaction costs and precision
3.1.1 Basic issues
21. In the case of positive TCs there is  trade-off between the level of such costs and the degree of
precision associated with particular policy choices. Precision is defined as the degree to which the set goals
are attained – i.e., the distance between the desired
7 and realized outcome. This has to be evaluated both
qualitatively and quantitatively. For example, the objective may be to change the quality of a landscape.
The policies needed may involve specifying new incentives, formulating contracts and policing them. The
costs of doing so should be weighed against the potential gains in achieving the objective. While the
marginal utility of precision (the MUP) would be expected to fall as precision increases, marginal
transactions costs (MTC) would be expected to increase.
                                                
5. The relationship between transaction costs and efficiency, is also strongly dependent on rights. Some basic
issues related to this point are presented in an appendix to this paper.
6. Typically, many authors talk about deviations from the 'efficient solution' or 'least cost solution' that
appears as soon as TC are observed. TC is, however, also a cost. The existence of TC does not create
inefficiencies in itself. They influence – like other costs –  what becomes efficient (Vatn 1998).
7. To be 'precise': given that TC are zero.6
Figure 2.The trade-off between transaction costs and precision
Notes: MUP = marginal utility of increased precision. MTC = marginal TC.
22. In Figure 2 the optimum will be found at q.
8 The MUP curve will vary according to the
characteristics of the good – e.g., the more site specific a good is, the greater MUP will be. The MTC curve
will also vary both with the character of the good and the type of policy.
23. Increasing precision is in principle the same as targeting. While this is, correctly, a strongly
appreciated characteristic of any policy (WTO 1995; OECD 2001), we also see that it involves a cost.
Maximum targeting is normally not a rational goal.
24. Figure 2 conceals several complex problems. The parties to the process will not, in reality, be
able to define what is an optimal information search nor an optimal form and level of policing. Concerning
information, the optimal stopping point is not definable. It is in the character of an information search
problem that we cannot know when we have the optimal set of information to make a choice. More
generally, if the cost of defining the optimum is part of the optimization process itself, the problem
becomes unsolvable. (Morgenstern 1935; Knudsen 1993).
25. Furthermore, access to information will normally be asymmetrically distributed between policy
makers (the principal) and the agents involved in the process. Much of the developments, especially in
environmental economics, have been focusing on creating consistent incentive structures for such
situations.
26. Finally, the problem of finding q in Figure 2 demands knowledge both about qualitative and
quantitative aspects. This complicates the information gathering and optimization process further.
Eggertsson (1990) emphasizes specifically how important the qualitative aspects are in TC analysis.
27. In the case of multifunctionality, a reasonable trade-off between TC and precision is strongly
linked to the relationships that exist between the goods involved. To the degree that the goods are jointly
produced, high precision can be obtained by a few, simple policy measures. If there is a private good
among the joint products, a simple incentive mechanism is likely to be found. To the degree that one has to
                                                
8. This conclusion demands that the fixed TCs are covered by the gain going from 0 to q (gain = the area
between the two marginal curves), A more comprehensive analysis of the trade-off problem outlined here
may be found in Vatn (1998).
MUP MTC
q
precision7
pay separately for each good, it is a challenge to develop simple criteria without loosing important
information. In analyzing these issues, one must not confuse what is least costly - i.e., to pay via a joint
private product - and jointness as a potential quality of the public good. Principally the first has to do with
TC and the cost of production while the latter has to do with the quality of the good.
28. Accepting reduced precision and thereby lower TC, may in many situations offer the most effi-
cient solution. There is a problem though. Such solutions may be perceived as unfair and thus politically
very controversial. Reduced precision may lead to a situation where not all agents producing a collective
good get paid for the quantities and/or qualities they deliver. Similarly, some that do not deliver may also
get paid. In the case of a public bad like pollution, some non-polluting agents may be taxed. This may
happen if regulations are on inputs or outputs and not on the emissions, or the effects of the emissions
(Vatn 2002).
3.1.2 Cultural landscape as an example
29. To illustrate some of the above points let us look at the cultural landscape using Figure 3.
30. Part I of the figure shows the optimum as defined only if the cost of producing the landscape
values and the utility they give are considered. This optimum will be found in q
*  –  i.e., where the marginal
utility (MU) equals the marginal production costs (MPC). Since the landscape is a good with many
qualities that are costly to measure, it may be that without specific controls of what is actually delivered,
the real delivery may be just q 1. In this situation the firms supposed to deliver the good will earn the
hatched area without delivering anything.
Figure 3. Optimal transaction costs concerning cultural landscape supply
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31. The area between the MU and MPC curve is a measure of net utility of increased precision. Part
II thus shows the marginal utility of precision, MUP(=MU-MPC). The shaded area represents the loss of
precision when farmers freely comply only up to q1 as measured against the 'ideal' situation in part I.
9 To
increase precision, some information and control measures need to be in place. Transaction costs will
appear. Their marginal value (MTC) is depicted in part III of the figure. Given that the double hatched area
is greater than the fixed TC involved, a new optimum is found in q
**. It is assumed that the regulatory
scheme results in exactly this amount being produced. In most situations it will be very difficult to find this
optimum precisely, because one will not be able to determine at which level of TC there is equality
between what is the (assumed) optimum and the actual delivery.
32. From this reasoning we see that in this case payments will be made for some landscape values
that are not delivered (q
* - q
**). The higher the TCs are, the greater the difference between what is required
and what is actually delivered will tend to be. Over the area where nothing is delivered/produced, the s
payment is equal to an income transfer.
33. The size of the TC and thus the difference between q
* and q
**, is also dependent on the degree to
which agents want to conform to the established policy. Further, Figure 3 is not explicit on the qualitative
aspects of the landscape. A great part of the TC will deal with securing the qualities required. In situations
dominated by complex/relational goods, TC may be substantial. A way to reduce TC may then be to utilize
the agent’s own insights and establish more participatory processes. Such participation may be important in
itself and not just as a way of reducing transaction costs.
3.2 Transaction costs, precision and actors' behavior
34. The type of policy measures used may influence agents’ behavior, specifically the need for
control. The existence of so-called intrinsic motivation may create situations where the conclusions
following from the standard utility maximization hypothesis may lead to bad predictions and drive policy
into unnecessarily costly paths.
35. The literature on intrinsic motivation or crowding out effects is increasing (see van Vugt 1996;
Frey and Oberholzer Gee 1997; Tenbrunsel and Messick 1999). Its development was triggered by
observations that increased price resulted in reduced supplies or that increased control resulted in lower
compliance. This kind of 'perverse' action may follow from the fact that the incentive used does not follow
the logic of the situation as conveyed by the agent. The payment may not be adequate or the producer may
look upon the good as something it is his duty to provide in any event. Examples are found in such widely
different areas as the giving of blood, choice of transportation  and environmental issues.
36. Concerning control Tenbrunsel and Messick (op.cit.) suggest that reduced compliance may result
from a reduction in the agents’ autonomy and self-respect. Beyond a certain level of control, the effects of
not complying are, however, so big, that the degree of compliance increases again. They thus find that
compliance as a function of control is U-formed.
37. In our situation these observations may be very important. First, the agents will usually be
farmers, who have generally a strong perception of themselves as individual decision-makers. Second, the
goods involved may appeal to different forms of intrinsic motivation and self-respect. Many identity-
                                                
9. The observant reader will see that given no TC as in part I, controls etc. are free. Thus a deviance between
q* and q1 does not appear in such an 'ideal' situation. This is an example of the type of inconsistencies that
is so hard to avoid in analyses of these issues. Being aware of it, I have still chosen to build Figure 3 in the
defined steps to make the argument more transparent.9
shaping elements seem to be attached especially to landscape values (Krogh 1995). This may also be the
case, to some extent, for food safety. Finally, the goods are complex and often relational. This makes it
very important to create a climate where cooperation and not control is predominant. Creating a common
culture is not only shaping identity. It is also a way of simplifying communication. It reduces the level of
TC through a reduced need for control and makes it possible to utilize the creativity of the individual
farmer and her community to produce high quality goods.
38. Studies by Ward and Lowe (1994) and Lowe et al. (1997) show how focusing on information and
participation increased ’precision’ considerably through establishing a better common understanding. Their
studies focused on environmental issues, and they illustrated the effects of a change in the relationship
between authorities and farmers concerning the delivery of these kinds of goods. Participation changed the
'game' from one of conflict and control to one of cooperation. These studies also show that what is
considered legitimate behavior – i.e., what in economic terms is conceived as a cost by the actors – is
influenced by the relationships between them.
39. These observations also tells us that it may be difficult to evaluate the level of TC ex ante, since it
is only ex post one knows whether the policy engaged people in a positive way or not.
4. Policy options
40. Turning to an explicit discussion about what are optimal/reasonable policy options, I will try to
integrate the various observations from the previous sections. It is not possible – at least at this stage – to
establish a model that incorporates all elements and does this in a unified structure. My strategy will be to
start by combining transaction cost analysis with the analysis of the characteristics of the goods in
question. Then I will make some proposals concerning how to harness farmers' own motivation.. Finally, I
will look at how to formulate a policy integrating across all goods, public and private, and how to handle
the uncertainties involved.
4.1 Policies and the character of the good
41. When discussing public policies, the Tinbergen (1950) conclusion that we need one policy
measure per goal, is strongly emphasized. From the above we realize that this conclusion demands zero
TC. If transaction costs are positive a less precise policy could be optimal. In the discussion of these issues,
I will start by looking at the cases of jointness and complementary/ competing separately as defined in
section 2.2.
10.
                                                
10. To avoid confusion, be aware that the concept of jointness is sometimes used for a broader category of
interrelated goods than in this study.10
Figure 4. Joint production of a private (y) and public (z) good
Optimal allocation in the market for the private good
4.1.1 A public good jointly produced with a private
42. The trade-off problem between TC and precision is easiest to study in a case where the public
good is jointly produced with a private good for which a market exists. This is quite a stylized situation.
According to Romstad et al. (2000) open landscape, some rural concerns and food safety are the kind of
goods that approximate the theoretical situation best.
11  Figure 4 illustrates some principal relationships:
43. As we see, the market for the private good y clears with the optimal amount y* produced. The
resulting amount of the public good z will be z'. This is a free good, but the supply of z' may not
necessarily be optimal. As long as its marginal value at z' is positive (MUz), higher levels may be wanted,
again with the necessary caution concerning potential increases in TC and the effect on other goods.
12
                                                
11. For the first point to hold – open landscape – increased production must require increased land. For the
third, the quality of the country's own production system is of importance. One must, however, be precise
here. Jointness does not imply that a country's agronomic system must be better than the situation in other
countries. In the case of animal diseases, if each country has just one  distinctive disease, trade may imply
the spread of all diseases to all countries. In this case no country can from the outset be said to be better or
worse than another.
12. Given jointness, this will imply increased production also of the private good compared to y*. This in itself
will raise several issues concerning the organization of the market for the private good, which I will not go
into here.
$
$
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44. Figure 4 shows a situation where the geographical spheres for the private good and the joint
public good are identical. Moving to a situation where this does not hold – e.g., free trade for the private
good and a national sphere for the public good – the situation becomes different. Figure 5 illustrates the
optimal choice for a country (N) whose agriculture is not competitive in the international market for the
private good.
Figure 5. Optimal pricing in the case of joint production of a private and a public good
with different geographical spheres
45. The upper part of the figure shows total values while the lower part shows  marginal ones. yn
denotes the national production of the private good in country N. z denotes the production of the joint
public good (by definition in country N only). TotC and TotU are total costs and utilities respectively. MC
and MU denotes the marginal costs and utilities. The subscript 'wm' denotes 'at world market prices' which
equals p
1. This means that the value of the production of y in country N is measured at this price.
Following from this, TotUy is linear in y. Given one market for the private good, the production of y in
country N will be y’n. This maximizes farmers’ profits. This gives a supply of the public good with a total
value of V’z. Following the assumption that country N is not competitive in the international market for y,
y’n is clearly below national consumption of y (not shown in the figure).
46. The allocation – y’n and V’z – is however not optimal. Jointness implies that when the private
good is produced, the public good is provided ‘for free’. The costs are common to the production of both
goods. In such a situation the optimal allocation is found where the marginal cost of producing y in country
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N (MCyn) equals the sum of marginal utilities for the private and public good (MUyn + MUz = MUyn,z).
Remember that MU yn equals the price P
1. The final national production of y and z taking all values into
account, will be y
*
n and V
*
n respectively.
47. How can this allocation be obtained? From a production point of view one can pay for z and get y
for free or one can pay for y and get z for free. There is no difference concerning resource allocation.
Taking TCs into account changes the conclusion. They make paying via y the least costly option in this
case. This relates to specific characteristics of the good. Since z is a public good, costs of exclusion  – i.e.
TC – are high. The optimum (least cost solution) can thus be obtained by raising the price for the private
good to p
2. 
13 While this is the option with the lowest TC, these costs are not zero even in this case. The
final optimum will thus be found (slightly) to the left of y*n.
48. One may argue that those consuming the private good are not necessarily those wanting the
public good. This may create legitimization problems. This is, however, not specific to joint goods. This
problem occurs with all taxation and public goods provision.
14
49. Following from Figure 5 is the conclusion that the need to increase the price for the private good
depends on the competitiveness of the private goods sector and the values of the attached public good(s).
Even in the case of a joint public good, this does not imply that a competitive country needs do nothing
more than focus on its private good production (see Figure 4).
50. Further, one has to observe that the geographical sphere of the public good may not be national.
If so, different prices of y may be warranted between different regions of the country. Depending on how
costly it is to set up local markets for the private good (TC), it may be preferable to pay the difference
between the 'national price' and the regional price from the public budget. The latter is also costly in TC
terms. Again TC related to the two options must be compared. In this case the question is an empirical one.
It is not possible to draw conclusions on a theoretical basis only.
51. The above reasoning is relevant also for a public bad or a negative externality that is jointly
produced. We only need to change the sign of the price correction. The price should be reduced relative to
the marginal cost of the negative externality. One should be aware that in many cases concerning negative
externalities, there exist markets both for inputs (like fertilizers) and as for outputs (like grain). Since
taxing the input may motivate farmers to use less of it  (technological shift), precision may be enhanced by
focusing the policy on the input. TC would not increase. Again this is a general conclusion, where the
outcome of  the alternative strategies (input or output) would be the same only when a single production
process (or technology) is possible or economically relevant
15 (see Vatn 1998).
4.1.2 A public good that is complementary in production
52. Complementarity implies that the jointness is indirect - it works via a joint production factor. In
our case land is very important in that respect. As we know from theory, complementarity may become
competition when the amount of the factor used for one of the products increases beyond a certain point.
While we thus far have used a functional kind of description, I will now turn to using the production
possibility set concept as the basis for the analysis.
53. Typical examples of complementarity turning into competition beyond a certain point are the
relationship between agricultural production and the aesthetic value of landscape or between agricultural
                                                
13. Since I have started out by  assuming that the price of y is at the world market level, if the price in country
N is  above p2, this analysis suggests it should be reduced.
14. Since the goods are joint in production, it is the distribution of costs, not the optimal amounts of the goods
that is influenced by the arguments about TC.
15. And we do not take income effects into account.13
production and biodiversity (Romstad et al. 2000). While openness as a landscape feature is related to
jointness, other features such as landscape mosaics are better understood within the complementary-
competing framework. The point is that land – the common factor of production – can be used either to
produce food or to produce roads, forest patches, border zones etc. Whether increasing the amount of
agricultural land increases overall landscape values depend on the existing combination of land use
features. Agricultural activity  may increase biodiversity up to a certain level, but beyond that level
biodiversity may fall. Again the threshold point is dependent on the types and relative sizes of various
ecosystems involved (Dragun 1998).
16
54. In the cases we discuss here, paying directly for the public good is warranted. Further, both
income and substitution effects must be considered. Figure 6 describes important relationships concerning
the dynamics of changing prices. Following Chambers (1988) the production possibility frontiers depicted
are defined by any combination of the private good y and the public good z that does not exceed a given
cost.
Figure 6. Income and substitution effects of changes in prices for a private (y) and public (z) good
55. Let us assume that A1 depicts the existing situation in a country where p y is the price for the
private good and pz is the payment for the public one. This situation is not considered optimal – too much y
and too little z is produced. Reducing p y induces a substitution effect moving allocation from A1 to A2.
Simultaneously, the income effect moves allocation to a new frontier – the one associated with the final
allocation B1. If relative prices are optimal at B1, while total supply of both z and y are too low, an
increase in pz and py keeping relative prices constant may move allocation to B2. If the change in relative
prices induces shifts in technological development, we will arrive on a production possibility frontier
different to that associated with A1.
56. In Figure 6 prices for both z and y are changed. An increase in the payment for z alone may result
either in decreased or increased production of y. This depends on the relative magnitudes of the income
and the substitution effects.
57. Increased complexity in the production relationships makes the evaluation of TC much more
demanding compared to goods that are jointly produced. The following briefly summarizes  the main
results in a non-technical way:
                                                
16. Dragun (1998) especially makes the argument that in Scandinavian forest areas agriculture generates
increased biodiversity up to a certain level and intensity. Gatto and Merlo (1999) present a model where
enhanced biodiversity is mainly in conflict with the production of food and fiber. The difference probably
depends very much on the type of natural environment.14
1.  Paying for z directly is  the first option to explore. If the associated TCs  are sufficiently low
to pay for the gain in precision, then paying for z directly will be the most favorable option.
My evaluation is that this is a rather rare case.
2.  If the TCs associated with paying for z directly are too high for this option to be relevant,
searching for 'proxies' is the next option to explore. Such a search implies reduced precision
by definition. Relevant proxies may be land in production, number of animals, meters of
stonewalls etc. Payments may take a variety of forms. Indicator payments (Parris 1999),
index payments (Nuppenau 1999), and input or production method subsidies are some
alternatives (Griffin and Bromley 1982). Cross compliance payments are another venue.
Again, choices are dependent on the trade-off between TC and precision, where one has to
look at the empirical relationships to be able to make any more specific conclusions.
3.  Whether the country is competitive or not in production of the private good y will influence
the conclusion. Simply put, the form and location of the production possibility frontiers
depend on the country specific costs of producing y. This implies that while one country may
only need to think about the size of z, other countries also need to think about the size of the
agricultural activities, implying changing  py.
58. Clearly, it is not possible to draw very strong conclusions concerning policy recommendations on
purely analytical grounds. Further research into these matters could reduce our reliance on empirical
studies as opposed to analytical work, but to date sufficient research has not yet been undertaken.
4.2 Utilizing/developing local motivation and creativity
59. While jointness is a rather simple case especially from a TC point of view, a situation
characterized by complementarity/competition makes things more complex. From the above we see that
reductions in TC when z is competing with y can almost always be obtained only through developing
proxies if a payment-control type of system is to be used. Because of the complexities involved it is almost
impossible to control/check the value of each single element of z that the farmer controls. Finally, policy
makers also need to take into account that the scheme may have negative effects on agents’ willingness to
comply.
60. In this situation there are few alternatives to developing a policy where the farming community’s
creativity is mobilized. Certainly paying for proxies like land under cultivation and animals in the
landscape are low cost options from a TC perspective and may secure some values at a reasonable degree
of precision without creating negative reactions.
17 Still, there are many very important elements in the
landscape whose quality can vary widely for any given number of hectares in use or number of animals
present. This concerns the distribution of these elements themselves in the landscape, their interactions, not
least with other landscape features that are relevant. One aspect is biodiversity and the care for specific
landscape elements that secures this. Another is the mosaic of fields, forest patches, hedgerows etc. that is
important from an aesthetic point of view.
61. Information and participation are prerequisites for establishing both the necessary climate of
cooperation and creativity to make the process work. If pride and self-respect can be attached to forms of
landscape management, it follows from the theory of intrinsic motivation, that the specific form of
payment has a much more limited role to play than would otherwise have been thought. Thus, substantial
TC reductions may be possible by creating the right processes and perspectives among farmers. The
greatest challenges in this respect are encountered when the visions of the farming communities and the
                                                
17. The relative amount of such payments compared to prices for products etc. may – at least with today’s
'productivist' ideology in farmer communities – be a concern. One of the potentials of communication is to
start processes that may result in changed ideologies and visions of these communities..15
rest of the society are conflicting.. How to facilitate a dialogue in this situation – how to gradually change
elements that are fundamental to the farmers' self-respect  is a challenge  even from a TC perspective.
4.3 Some principles for developing a coherent policy across categories of goods
62. Even though I have discussed rather stylized situations, the 'landscape' painted so far has become
complex. Formulating an optimal – I would rather like to talk about reasonable – policy implies that we
have to deal with the following trade-off problems:
-  Taking all the relevant public goods into account whether they are goods or bads, whether the
relationships between them are best described as joint or complementary/competing.
-  Taking into account that many goods are relational – i.e., that one cannot study the value of
one good in isolation from the others.
-  Taking into account that some of the public goods can be delivered other than by agriculture
or land based activities.
-  Taking into account that TC vary substantially between policy options, making some goods
not worth persuing under some policies and highly valuable under others.
63. If the problem had been only of the type described in a), we could have defined the optimum as a
situation in which, across all goods and bads, marginal gains are equal.
18 Certainly we encounter
measurement problems, but since these problems are part of the TC issue they fall under point d).
Introducing relational aspects (point b) implies accepting that marginal gains and costs are interdependent.
The most one can say about this, is that it emphasizes the need for local adaptation of policies. Introducing
the issue of delivery by other sectors (point c) expands the analysis. to other fields of society. Finally,
introducing TC not only creates a need to compare the TCs of different policy options for each good in
isolation. We also need to take the effects these options have on realizing the other goods into
consideration. This is the core effect of multifunctionality. It is very challenging indeed to make all the
trade-off calculations involved in points a-d. In this situation one has to try to develop some meta rules as
guidelines. While we are not yet in a position to make extensive recommendations, the following points
can be proposed:
-  Exhausting the cost reduction potential connected to jointness and complementarities. If
goods can be jointly produced, there is a potential for cost reduction (Hoel and Moene 1993;
Shumway et al. 1984). Picking the least costly solution for each public good in isolation (if
physically possible to isolate), will most probably not produce the cheapest total solution.
This argument is highly relevant given all the interconnectednesses observed in relation to
public and private goods in agriculture. Including TC in the evaluation will strengthen this
conclusion further.
-  The competitiveness of the agricultural sector concerning private goods. This factor will
strongly influence which main strategy to choose for a specific country. In the case of a
highly competitive country,  the focus will have to be put on the jointly produced public bads
and on public goods of the complementary/competing kind. In the case of a country that is
not  competitive, jointly produced goods must also be considered since their supply  may be
threatened.
                                                
18. Certainly for this conclusion non-convexities must be assumed. This is not a trivial point, though.16
-  Extensification. The situation for agriculture – at least in western countries – points to
extensification as a strategy with low cost  and some distinct potential  gains. Again the
situation will vary somewhat across countries.
-  Developing strategies that utilize farmers’ creativity and ability to cooperate. The more
complex and the more local the qualities are, the more important this is, both to increase
precision and to reduce TC.
64. Concerning points 1 and 3, a specific comment needs to be made. The degree of jointness and
complementarity depends on the type of farming.. One way to minimize production and transaction costs
would be to support practices that have the potential to reduce bads and instead increase goods. What the
society then buys is a package that has potential to avoid certain harms and for delivering environmental
goods. This system could be formulated as a type of cross compliance.
19 From a TC-precision point of
view, a solution that blocks certain negative effects and simultaneously stimulates the creation of positive
externalities, seems potentially to be a good compromise.
65. The above thinking is part of what could be called an integrated approach. It may be contrasted
with its counterpart - a separation approach. In the latter case focus is on creating markets or public
demand for each good separately. Certainly, this strategy is familiar to us economists. It is targeted, it
keeps trade and non-trade issues apart. It is easier to reach analytical results if the problem is posed in this
way. The danger is that it leads us into inefficient avenues.
66. Looking at the economics literature, I find three issues that are of special importance here:
-  The commodity concept tends to pervade our understanding of what constitutes a good.
-  Private markets are always seen as the superior way of conveying information about what
should be produced.
-  The effect of TCs is underestimated
67. One of the strengths of the market and the associated commodity concept is that it creates
independencies. The same commodity – like a nail or a piece of butter – can be used by the buyer for
different purposes. This greatly simplifies coordination, which is very attractive. As emphasized in this
paper, public goods attached to agriculture are characterized by  interdependencies. In this case the
commodity concept is generally not sound.(Vatn 2000). Trying to demarcate the goods so that they become
commodities may result in a loss of quality, in high TCs or both.
68. Turning to the second point – the question of how to measure environmental values – this has
been a highly controversial issue for many years (see among others Clark et al. 2000; Daimond and
Hausman 1994; Foster 1997; Hanemann 1994; Portney 1994; Vatn and Bromley 1994). One fairly robust
conclusion from this debate is that the values estimated are dependent on the type of elicitation method or
value articulating institution used, be it contingent valuation of different kinds, contingent ranking, citizen
juries or focus groups. This depends partly on the different weight various methods give to income, which
kind of information is considered relevant and the role of dialogue.
69. Certainly markets can offer some solutions, even concerning what has been termed public goods.
There are cases where technological change makes costs of exclusion (TC) low enough that a good can be
transformed from public to private (Figure 1). There are situations where this does not reduce the quality of
the good significantly. However, I still support Falconer and Whitby (1999) in that the characteristics
involved ‘pose significant hurdles to private market contracting’ (p. 69). The formation of clubs seems to
                                                
19. Normally cross-compliance schemes are voluntary – utilizing the potential of separate equilibriums. To the
extent that public goods are relational across farm borders, this option may not be particularly important.17
open up some possibilities, especially since the level of TC is lower than what is necessary under
individual demand. We will, however, soon come to ‘close the circle’ here. From the TC point of view, the
state is also a type of club.
5. Conclusions
70. This paper has basically been about the cost of targeting when goods are complex. The main
challenge has been to evaluate the balance between transaction costs and precision. When doing this, it has
been necessary to focus on the character of various goods and their interrelationships.
71. In the case of public goods (bads) that are jointly produced with private goods, the volume of the
public good required can be achieved simply by changing the price of the private good. This is a low TC
option. The conclusion is only complicated if the geographical sphere of the market for the private and the
public good are not the same. In cases where jointness is not strict – e.g., variable proportions – it may be
warranted to add direct measure(s) for the provision of the public good. Whether it is reasonable to do this,
depends on whether a net gain can be obtained, increased TCs having been taken into account.
72. In cases where the private and public goods are complementary or competing, measures need to
be directed towards the public good.
20This can be done as direct public payments, or through public pay-
ments designated towards various proxies for the specific goods. The latter is often the only viable
possibility taking TC into account. In some cases it may be possible to create markets for the ‘public good’
– i.e. transforming it into a private one. The TCs associated with direct payments are high due to
complexity, a factor that also reduces the potential for creating markets (high demarcation costs). Depen-
ding on the character of the complementarities involved and the competitiveness of a country’s agriculture,
support for private goods provisioning may be warranted also in this case.
73. Focusing on TC not only creates a need for comparing the TC of each policy. When analyzing
policies for one good, we also need to consider the effects they have on the cost of realizing the other ones
as part of a multifunctional agriculture. Further, we must focus not only on the technical relationships. We
must also consider the effect of the policies on farmers’ ability and willingness to participate. The level of
TC depends on this.
74. In this situation I have opted for an integrated approach as compared to a separation strategy.
Basically the integrated approach makes it possible to exhaust three potential gains:
-  the gains of jointness: the potential for reduced production cost
-  the increased quality of the goods: emphasizing the relational aspects between goods
-  the reductions in TC: utilizing the potential for reduced TC following especially from
jointness in production
75. The complexity makes it difficult to quantify all the relationships involved. For some this is an
argument against the policy options flowing from an analysis emphasizing complexity. This is not a
reasonable critique. The argument must be balanced. Both the separated and the integrated approaches
have the same measurement problems. It is no less problematic to calculate gains and losses associated
with thinking in separate goods and markets than thinking in a more systems oriented way. In the end, this
boils down to who should bear the burden of proof.
                                                
20. In cases where losses in the competing ranges are smaller than the necessary TC to run this policy, there is
no allocative argument for measures directed towards the public good.18
76. We must also consider more deeply what could constitute a proof. It is not only that which may
be quantified that should count as such. Analytical reasoning combined with practical judgment may take
us far in deciding what is a reasonable policy. This is actually at the heart of the TC issue. Since it is costly
to know, judgments not only calculations will always lie at the basis of any decision. Still, making efforts
towards quantifying at least the magnitudes of TCs is an important task.19
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APPENDIX: A NOTE ON RIGHTS, TRANSACTION COSTS AND EFFICIENCY
1. In economics, welfare theory is the main basis for making policy evaluations. Under the
assumptions that rights are distributed, goods are private and homogeneous and transaction costs are zero
21,
it is shown that markets will facilitate attainment of the social optima when defined in Paretian terms
(Boadway and Bruce 1984).
2. State 'intervention' is, however, supported if markets fail to stand up to the defined presumptions
(Bator 1958). Public goods and externalities constitute the prime examples where regulation is accepted
(Boadway and Bruce 1984). These conclusions presume a specific understanding of rights and TC. Being
imprecise here may create substantial errors.
3. In the society rights have the twin role of defining both which interests are to be protected and
following from that which resource allocations become efficient (Bromley 1989). In welfare theory it is the
last issue that is focused. Rights (or endowments) are taken for given. The distribution of rights is a
normative issue outside the scope of economics. However, in most institutional reforms like defining
environmental policies or setting rules for international trade, the issue is foremost about defining or
redefining rights. Still, it is very often cast in efficiency terms. This is bewildering.
4. Let me start with a simple example – the problem of defining what is a positive or negative
externality. Trying to clarify this on pure physical grounds has failed (Coase 1960, Vatn and Bromley
1997). Whether A is presumed to restrict neighbor B's possibilities when A lets his trees grow high or B
restricts A's when demanding that they be cut is a question of defining  property rights. Whether it is the
trees or the access to sunshine that is to be protected cannot be defined on the basis of physical
characteristics. It is only through defining rights to resources that it becomes  clear what is a harm or a
sacrifice (Bromley 1991).
5. Given zero transaction costs, rights are important only for the distribution of income, not the
optimal resource allocation.
22 If B wants sun more than A wants trees - i.e., if B is willing to pay more for
sun than A for the trees - they will be cut independent of who has the initial right.
23
6. In a situation with positive transaction costs – i.e., in any real world circumstances – this is not
so. Since trading, setting up agreements etc. is costly, the distribution of rights is crucial in defining which
resource use becomes efficient (Randall 1974; Bromley 1991). Scheele (1999) discusses this issue
explicitly for agriculture and the environment, showing the need for defining a baseline –in his case using
'good agronomic practice' as a reference point. From the (necessarily normative) definition of that baseline
                                                
21. In relation to the above discussion, zero transaction costs imply no costs of exclusion meaning that the
distinction between private and public goods becomes irrelevant along that dimension. Thus quality
variation and non-excludability become irrelevant to the analysis. Some of the inconsistencies in applied
welfare theory stems from lack of systematic treatment of this issue.
22. To be precise also a population with homogeneous and homothetic preferences have to be assumed for this
conclusion to hold.
23. This is known as the Coase theorem.23
it becomes possible to evaluate whether an activity implies a positive or negative change – for example
whether the Provider Gets or Polluters Pays Principle should be used.
7. Rights have to be defined and secured by a certain authority structure like the state. Implicit in
the rights definition is a certain social welfare function. It is on the basis of these rights that individuals or
firms can make their bargains. Thus, there are two levels: a basic (constitutional) level defining rights and
an operational level making choices or bargains given these right structures.
8. The innate problem, especially in international trade, is the process of defining rights between
countries or agents in different countries. Here, there is no common authority structure like a parliament
defining a common social welfare function, specifying when something is harmful to somebody, etc. This
issue has to be determined on the basis of a bargain between states.
9. One type of problem follows from the fact that these independent powers are not equal in reality.
This is important, especially concerning developing countries. More fundamentally, though, a right must
run from an authority structure that is common to all states – i.e., some sort of a 'super state'. Since there is
no common norm, we observe that efficiency arguments 'intrude' as a legitimate, even a determinate
argument over which rights should exist. This can, however, not be right. It is doomed to create circularity
and confusion. We observe this in the debate about 'trade distortions'.
10. When a trade regime is set up giving country A the right to export its products freely to country B
and vice versa, this is based on the argument that both countries will gain from trade. When for example
country B realizes that the external effects of that trade are such that the net effect for B is negative, it may
want to change the regime. Should that issue be determined on the basis of who gains the most from either
institutional structure or should each country be given a right to define some standards to protect itself?
Certainly this is a very difficult issue when no common authority structure or social welfare function
exists. It is, however, logically wrong to determine the outcome on the basis of who is willing (or able) to
pay the most for a specific rights structure and call it efficient. This reasoning is and will always be
circular.
11. The above problem should not be a problem in the case when rights are defined and all goods are
strictly private (no TC). Then no Pareto relevant externalities will occur across countries.
24 What concerns
us here is the case when the same good has both private and public attributes (e.g., various levels of TC),
or when there are interrelations between the production of the two types of goods. This is typically the case
with many functions related to agriculture.
12. The distinction often made between 'trade' and 'non-trade concerns' – e.g., WTO (1995) – may
illustrate the latter problem. This division is very much interpreted as a distinction between private and
public goods. The logic seems to be that countries should be free to choose its policy when nationally
defined public goods are involved, while efficiency will be lost if private goods are not freely traded. It is
very important to acknowledge that this conclusion is dependent on the assumptions of zero TC and no
interrelated functions across the distinction private - public.
13. According to Coase (1960) and Dahlman (1979) one should be very careful with analyses based
on the so-called first best assumptions as defined in welfare theory. These are unrealistic. One should
instead make comparative analysis on the basis of attainable structures and realistic assumptions about
goods, markets, and I would like to add human capabilities.
                                                
24. To be fully correct we should also add: when distribution does not matter and welfare is defined only as the
sum of the individuals' utility.